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 Chapter 1: 
Though my father’s family is ethnically Chinese, they have been living in 
Indonesia since the early 1900’s. When my father was growing up, the Indonesian 
government forcibly tried to eradicate his Chinese heritage. He was not allowed to speak 
or learn the Chinese language and was forced to change his last name to an Indonesian 
one. My brother and I were passed down stories about my grandmother burning Chinese 
newspapers at her own fireplace for her family’s safety. It was a perilous time to be a 
Chinese Indonesian as their Chinese heritage was threatened and their definitions of 
nationality muddled.   
 The tensions between the ethnic Chinese and native Indonesians is a topic that is 
frequently marginalized in Southeast Asian and Indonesian history. While the ethnic 
Chinese comprise of only 1.2% of the total population in Indonesia, they dominate the 
economic sector and generally make up a large part of the economic elite. However, 
despite the generally high economic status of these Chinese Indonesians, they face 
discrimination from both the government and the local Indonesians. Furthermore, the 
ethnic Chinese are never seen as truly Indonesians, even though many of the ethnic 
Chinese have descendants who have lived in Indonesia for hundreds of years. The ethnic 
Chinese are treated and scorned as peranakan—outsiders—to the totok—or the native 
Indonesians. Because of this attitude that the ethnic Chinese are peranakan, authority 
figures—whether it was the Dutch colonists or the Suharto regime—have exploited this 
tension by painting the ethnic Chinese as the scapegoat for many of Indonesia’s 
economic problems. The discrimination of the ethnic Chinese Indonesian was most open 
and visible during the Suharto era of Indonesian history, when government laws forbade 
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Chinese Indonesians to have their own language schools and when Chinese Indonesians 
frequently relied on the bribery of gangsters in order to ensure their protection against 
racial violence from other peranakan Indonesians. While the post-Suharto era has led to a 
lifting of discriminatory laws against the ethnic Chinese, there is still a long-standing 
discriminatory bias that the ethnic Chinese must continually face and overcome, not to 
mention a confusion question of nationality that each and every ethnic Chinese person 
must struggle to answer.  
 As mentioned above, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese is a very narrow topic in 
a Southeast Asian country that is not the strongest player in East Asia or even Southeast 
Asia. However, the discrimination of the ethnic Chinese minority is a fascinating case 
study as diaspora populations start to migrate around the world. The ethnic Chinese 
represent a maligned minority that stands out recent Indonesian history. As technology 
allows the world to grow more and more interconnected and transnational migration 
becomes more common, it is important to see the reasons why certain countries 
discriminate certain ethnic minorities. It is also important to see how this discrimination 
affects the victimized ethnic minority community. Particularly in a post-Colonial world 
where many of the world’s nations aren’t even a century old, it is important to see how 
centuries long discrimination of an ethnic minority can affect how they view their own 
nationality. The ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia is a unique case in that it has a 
multitude of different reasons behind their oppression, since the ethnic Chinese minority 
occupied different levels in the social and economic stratopheres. Lastly, the study of the 
ethnic Chinese minority is important because there is a growing Chinese diaspora all over 
the world. This Chinese diaspora brings about Chinese immigrants, most of whom are 
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wealthy and have incredibly strong corporate power and ties such as the more recent 
ethnic Chinese immigrants to Indonesia, who resettle all over the world. In many cases, 
these immigrants fro the Chinese diaspora are redefining transnational migration. Often 
times, they decide on where to define their legal citizenship based on economic values 
and thus leave the social concept of citizenship subject to interpretation. Studying the 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is a smaller case study in the larger issue of the Chinese 
diaspora today and how they define transnational citizenship. 
  Since the established literature is mostly political, economic, and social histories 
of modern Indonesia, my thesis will establish motivations behind the context of the 
discrimination of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia with particular attention on how it 
affects the perception of ethnic Chinese Indonesian’s nationality.  Most of the times in 
the established literature, the history, motivations, and consequences behind the 
discrimination of the ethnic Chinese are briefly summarized or put in as an afterthought. 
Most of the present day established literature is focused on how the now-allowed Chinese 
imports are starting to influence Indonesian culture and how post-Suharto regimes have 
taken steps to at least tolerate the ethnic Chinese population.  Since Indonesia is such a 
new nation, it is important to establish why a key player in its initial start up economy 
was targeted for racism for so long. My thesis will use the thread of Dutch colonialism 
and the impact of Western ideologies of democracy and nationalism to explain the 
reasons behind ethnic Chinese discrimination in Indonesia.  
 Thus, my thesis question will ask what are the reasons behind the discrimination 
of the ethnic Chinese and how it affected perception of ethnic Chinese Indonesian 
nationality. Furthermore, my thesis question will address all the sub-questions that come 
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with it such as do the roots stem from Dutch colonization or does it go back further than 
that? How can the ethnic Chinese be discriminated against socially when most of them 
are in the upper economic strata of the country? Do the native Indonesians consider the 
ethnic Chinese Indonesian to be proper citizens of Indonesia? Do the ethnic Chinese 
consider themselves as citizens of Indonesia or China?  And how did different ruling 
regimes affect the perceptions of Chinese Indonesian nationality? 
 The first most common approach to the discrimination of the ethnic Chinese is the 
“state-centered [approach] in which political themes and questions of citizenship prevail” 
(Dielman, Koning, and Post 4). First of all, it is important to define state-centered theory 
as a theory “which emphasizes the impact of government on civil society, especially via 
the messages that public programs send to their value to the polity”. Thus, this approach 
mostly focuses on how the Indonesian government perpetuates and encourages or 
simmers down the discrimination of the ethnic Chinese. The political themes that would 
be covered in this state-centered approach is primarily the relation of the ethnic-Chinese 
as a political economic group. The literature that takes the state-centered approach 
primarily focus on how most of the ethnic-Chinese consisted of the economic elite and 
how government leaders would negotiate and try to establish economically mutually 
beneficial relationships with them, despite setting up government regulations to 
discriminate their political status in Indonesia. Lastly, the questions of citizenship as an 
approach is one that usually relies on looking back to say the 1949 Indonesian 
Constitution and defining what it means to be an Indonesian citizen. The literature tries to 
define why the ethnic Chinese are seen as “peranakan”, or outsiders, despite some having 
descendants who have lived in Indonesia for many generations. 
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 The state-centered approach relates to my specific thesis question because it 
answers the question by blaming the government and political structure of Indonesia as 
the reason behind the ethnic Chinese discrimination.  By blaming government structures, 
the literature puts the blame on certain Indonesian leaders such as the most prominent 
modern Indonesian leader and former president Suharto, who was in power from 1967-
1998. During his rule, Suharto banned all ethnic-based parties and sociopolitical 
organizations by the time the officially assumed power in 1966 (Suryadinata 506) or 
closing down all Chinese language schools. Thus, this proves that one of the reasons 
behind the discrimination of the ethnic Chinese is because the government mandated it to 
be so. In my thesis, I will dig deeper into the reasons on why Suharto and the Indonesian 
government put out discriminatory policies against the Chinese, especially when it was 
also established in the literature that Suharto—much like other Indonesian rulers and 
government bodies—relied on the wealthy ethnic Chinese economic elite for financial 
matters. Also, the question of citizenship that is approached in the literature often dates 
back to the 1947 Constitution, which defines that “the Chinese are citizens (warga 
negara) of Indonesia—insofar as citizenship signifies membership in the state”. However, 
despite the citizenship, the ethnic Chinese are not “widely perceived as members of the 
nation (warga bangsa)”. The literature also approaches the question of citizenship by 
tracing the roots back to Dutch colonization, which thus establishes a time period of 
history to look back for this thesis.  This literature, particularly the literature written in 
English, looks back to old Dutch colonial official documents and diaries to determine the 
status and thoughts of the colonialists on the ethnic Chinese. Thus, this establishes an 
outsider perspective on the ethnic Chinese.  
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 However, this state-centered approach is not without it’s flaws, it’s main one 
being that this approach does not give the ethnic Chinese any agency in the narrative 
whatsoever. In the state-centered approach that the literature, the ethnic Chinese are 
depicted and portrayed as completely powerless, despite the elite economic status they 
hold. Whenever I examined the state-centered approach, I always found this duality odd 
and contrasting. However, the previous literature does not even mention the existence of 
this contrasting duality in which is a rather gaping hole in the logic of determining the 
amount of agency and political power the ethnic Chinese have. 
 Furthermore, looking back to the Dutch colonialist works to examine the ethnic 
Chinese is incredibly flawed because it is using secondhand sources. Often times, these 
Dutch colonialists are viewing the ethnic Chinese through a very biased lens. In fact, the 
Dutch colonialists had their own biased agenda against the ethnic Chinese because they 
saw them as a threat to their consumer market in native Indonesia. Thus, “The Dutch 
language press in, the Indies took up the cause. News papers became, for the most part, 
vehicles for the broadcasting of anti Chinese propaganda” (38).  Thus, the Dutch colonial 
sources on ethnic Chinese are intrinsically biased because they want the native 
Indonesians to hold prejudice against the ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, by relying on an 
outsider perspective to determine the social standing of the ethnic Chinese, this literature 
ignores the perspectives of the ethnic Chinese themselves who lived in the era of Dutch 
colonialism. However, Dutch colonial sources still make up a small part on the sector of 
ethnic Chinese citizenship in Indonesia literature. 
 Another common approach the established literature has taken in analyzing the 
discrimination of the ethnic Chinese is the Chinese diaspora method, or viewing the 
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ethnic Chinese people as a human representative of China and it’s politics with Indonesia. 
The Chinese diaspora is the influx of Chinese immigrants that are moving to new places 
across the world. Most significantly, many of these Chinese immigrants now have a lot of 
wealth and are able to carryover that wealth into their new residencies. The first wave of 
the Chinese diaspora consisted of people who either did not have or could transfer their 
economic status to their new residences. When this generation of Chinese immigrants 
moved, they had to start over in their new countries from the bottom. They often had to 
occupy certain sectors of business markets that were considered undesirable. For 
example, when Chinese immigrants moved to California because of the Gold Rush, many 
of them were forced to open Laundromats because Laundromats were considered to be 
“woman’s work” and hence undesirable. Furthermore, because of this low economic 
status, Chinese immigrants had low social standing in their new countries too. Things are 
different nowadays. “Today, overseas Chinese are key players in the booming economies 
of the Asia Pacific region” (Ong 110). In today’s global sphere, high economic status 
generally brings about a certain amount of upper social status, even if there are plenty of 
prejudices and biases aimed against non-white people. For example, luxury brands such 
as Louis Vuitton have to consider the Chinese as a main customer base when marketing 
their products. Thus, it can be said that many of these new Chinese immigrants of the 
China diaspora are generally living with much more economic and social privilege 
compared to previous Chinese immigrants. The study of the Chinese diaspora in the 
literature of Chinese Indonesians mostly focuses on the modern Chinese immigrants and 
characterizing them as immigrants that bring a lot of wealth and economic power with 
them as they immigrated into Indonesia. 
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 The Chinese diaspora is significant to the study of the Chinese Indonesians 
because it links the Chinese Indonesians to their roots. The focus of the Chinese diaspora 
in the Chinese Indonesian literature establishes the links that Chinese Indonesians have 
with China. Many times, this literature looks to the political actions of China as a motive 
behind the interactions between the Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians. 
The study of the Chinese diaspora in the literature of Chinese Indonesians suggests that 
the political actions of China are undeniably intertwined with the treatment of Chinese 
Indonesians. For example, if Indonesia is having tense relations with China, the 
Indonesian government will retaliate by issuing some edict that discriminates Chinese 
Indonesians and even the common people will develop an anti-Chinese attitude as a result 
of China and Indonesia’s relations. Thus, the study of the Chinese diaspora suggests that 
China’s political status is another motive for ethnic Chinese discrimination in Indonesia. 
 Furthermore, the study of the Chinese diaspora also suggests that another motive 
behind the reason for ethnic Chinese discrimination is because of their economic ties to 
China. “Two major reasons why the economic life of the Chinese in Indonesia constitutes 
an impediment to their assimilation are, first, the structure of the Indonesian economy 
and the peculiar place in it that the Chinese have been historically forced to take; and 
second, the persistence of the economic aspects of Chinese familism, that is, the 
"exclusiveness" of Chinese enter-prise.” (465). Thus, this suggests that the indigenous  
Indonesians discriminate against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia out of jealousy. They 
are jealous of the ethnic Chinese business, wealth, and ties back to China.  
 However, this mode of study in the established literature is heavily flawed 
because it uses outdated notions of the definition of citizenship. The Chinese diaspora 
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viewpoint of the established literature frequently relies on assumptions about the ethnic 
Chinese in order to make their case. It assumes that the ethnic Chinese are literal 
metaphors for China. It doesn’t consider the social context that Chinese Indonesians  
lived in Indonesian society compared to the political maneuverings of high ranking, 
privileged officials in China.  Furthermore, this school of theory once again does not 
ascribe any power to the ethnic Chinese whatsoever. It is another school of thought which 
denies the Chinese Indonesians agency for their actions. It does not consider the reasons 
behind why Chinese Indonesians would choose to identify as more Chinese, more 
Indonesian, or other. The Chinese diaspora school of study in the Chinese Indonesian 
literature does not allow for the perspectives of Chinese Indonesians to define their own 
nationality.  
 First off, the school of Chinese diaspora in the established Chinese literature 
genuinely does not consider the role of modern powerful, wealthy Chinese family 
networks. After all, “for many overseas Chinese, there is no obvious continuity between 
family interests and political loyalty” (Ong 116). Many of these overseas Chinese choose 
their state of residencies based on economic factors.  On the other hand, many other 
ethnic Chinese had descendants who came to Indonesia generations ago and do not have 
any economic and social advantage in Indonesian society whatsoever. Thus, many of the 
ethnic Chinese choose not define their citizenship or face identity crises when 
considering their citizenship. However, the commonly established literature of the first 
state-centered approach focuses more on how the indigenous Indonesians define legal 
citizenship and does not give full consideration in the ways how the Chinese Indonesians 
respond to the citizenship laws.  
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 The last approach that is used in the literature is “regime change”. Unlike the 
state-centered and Chinese diaspora approach, this school of approach assigns a more 
aggressive role to the Chinese Indonesians. While the other two approaches treat the 
Chinese Indonesians as merely agency-less victims to their circumstances, the regime 
change approach finds that regime changes can be both “constraining and enabling” (p. 
13). In fact, the school of regime change is a reactionary response to the state-centered 
and Chinese diaspora approaches. This school of thought originated and is mostly 
perpetuated through the essays that are collected in the book Chinese Indonesians and 
Regime Change. Therefore, it is not nearly as common as the state-centered and Chinese 
diaspora approaches.  
 The regime change approach is all about the Chinese Indonesians navigating 
through the discrimination and political and social stumbling blocks put upon them by 
society and redefining their identities and political, economic, and social roles in society 
for themselves. For example in Chapter 8 of Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change, 
the author Peter Pong analyzes how the ethnically Chinese Oei Tem Hang Concern 
business did business in a pre-World War II Indonesia.  Peter Pong notes that the family 
members of the Oei Tam Hang Concern had radically modern opinions of ethnicity, 
nationality, and citizenship in that they left it ambiguous. The Oei Tam Hang Concern 
family was cosmopolitan in every true sense and determined their ethnicity, nationality, 
and citizenship in terms of economic feasibility over legally defined definitions of 
ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship. Thus, the regime change approach is a way of 
studying how the Chinese Indonesians themselves navigate around discrimination by 
using more cosmopolitan definitions of ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship in order to 
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navigate and maneuver around political and social stumbling blocks in order to obtain 
their economic interests.  
 Since the regime change approach is about empowering Chinese Indonesians, it is 
understandable that it seems completely at odds with my thesis at first. However, the 
regime change approach is still related to my thesis in that while it doesn’t delve into the 
reasons that have caused discrimination among Chinese Indonesians, the regime change 
approach instead implies that that there will always be structural reasons behind the 
discrimination of the Chinese Indonesians. As long as the Chinese Indonesians still have 
their legally and biologically defined ethnic roots in China, they will always face 
discrimination. However, the regime change approach school of thought states that these 
eternal structural reasons behind the discrimination of the Chinese Indonesians do not 
matter because the Chinese Indonesians have proven and will continue to maneuver their 
way to fight against this structural racism.  Also, another important thing about this 
regime change approach study is that it defines Chinese Indonesians as “a diverse and 
socially active group, whose histories and agencies are heterogeneous and locally 
embedded and cannot be homogenized into a singular framework” (p. 3). The other two 
studies tend to group Chinese Indonesians in either one or two groups when the truth of 
the matter is that every single Chinese Indonesian person has their own different story to 
tell and cannot be categorized so easily. The last important thing about this viewpoint that 
is relevant to my thesis is the importance of the social and cultural definitions of 
citizenship. While the legal citizenship status of Chinese Indonesians is under constant 
question and scrutiny, the Chinese Indonesians can and many do redefine traditional 
	   12	  
cultural and social definitions of citizenship into something more cosmopolitan in order 
to achieve empowerment. 
 However, there are several aspects of the regime change school of thought that are 
unable to encompass all the aspects of Chinese Indonesian identity and history. For one 
thing, how does flexible citizenship apply to Chinese Indonesians who are past first 
generation? While it is easy for first generations to Chinese Indonesians to claim 
cosmopolitan definitions of social and cultural citizenship, it is harder for Chinese 
Indonesians who are of the 1.5, 2nd, 3rd, and further generations to claim this flexible 
citizenship because they will be more assimilated into Indonesian culture.  Especially 
since there are plenty of Chinese Indonesian family who have lived in Indonesia for 
generations, flexible citizenship is going to be hard for them to relate to and thus they 
will be unable to derive the empowerment that first generation Chinese Indonesians do. 
Furthermore, circumstances in Indonesia—particularly during Suharto’s regime—made 
flexible citizenship a legally unfeasible thing to consider. 
 Also while empowerment through redefining social and cultural redefining is 
important, Chinese Indonesians still suffer under systematic racism. Just because there 
are schools of thought in the literature that assign Chinese Indonesians agency, that 
doesn’t mean that the reasons behind the racism are suddenly eradicated or considered 
irrelevant. The topic of systematic racism is still very relevant in the Chinese Indonesian 
narrative and to ignore it or consider it as a simple obstacle that was easily overcome in 
order to assign agency to the Chinese Indonesians is misguided and false. The regime 
change school of thought often ignores or disregards how government policies of say the 
Suharto regime presented insurmountable obstacles against the Chinese Indonesians 
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being able to learn the Chinese language or so forth. Furthermore, while the regime 
change school of thought acknowledges the fact that there is a wealth of different Chinese 
Indonesian experiences, too often it still assumes that Chinese Indonesians are 
automatically wealthy with it’s flexible citizenship theory and does not devote enough 
attention to Chinese Indonesians in a lower socioeconomic class. 
 All three methods of approach in the existing Chinese Indonesian literature have 
merit to them. There is value in taking a state-centered approach, in looking at the 
Chinese diaspora, and the regime change approach. It’s essential to understand the 
government and political motivations behind the discrimination of the Chinese 
Indonesians, the way the Chinese diaspora plays into it, and give the Chinese Indonesians 
some semblance of agency in their own narrative. However, all three of these methods 
are very narrow and isolated from larger political and historical threads going on in and 
around the country of Indonesia. They use very narrow definitions of what exactly is 
considered a “peranakan” Indonesian in the first place, when the very definition of an 
Indonesian is a vague, broad, and unsatisfactory term. Indonesia is a country with many 
different communities of people who do not identify with each other. The idea of a 
peranakan Indonesian is mostly a politically unifying term, since there is nothing 
unifying about Indonesians apart from the fact that they live in similar areas and share the 
same history and impacts of Dutch colonialism. It is this legacy of Dutch colonialism that 
not only binds Indonesia together but also continues to define both Indonesian politics 
and sociocultural movements that in turn impact Chinese Indonesians. The legacy of 
colonialism is not emphasized enough in the narrative of Chinese Indonesian 
discrimination during the Suharto era and beyond, which is especially puzzling 
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considering the tumultuous relationship that the Dutch and the Chinese Indonesians had 
back when Indonesia was considered the Dutch Indies.  Furthermore, Indonesia is a 
nation founded on the idea of Western liberal democracy. It’s very foundations as a 
nation are influenced by colonialism.   
 Thus, my thesis will explore the reasons behind Chinese Indonesian 
discrimination using all the previous methods established in the literature such as the 
state-centered approach, the Chinese diaspora approach, the regime change approach 
along with a broader perspective of Indonesia by focusing on how the legacy of Dutch 
colonialism seeps into the Indonesian political and sociocultural climate that both relied 
and shut out the Chinese Indonesians. 
 I will support my claim by connecting second hand research on Indonesian 
history, Chinese Indonesian history, and the history of Sino-Indonesian relations. 
Unfortunately, I am not a fluent native speaker of Indonesian so I will have to make do 
with English language resources. However, I will also tie in the political happenings of 
China and the rest of world, since most Chinese Indonesian/Indonesian sources tend to be 
very insular.  
 The rest of this thesis project will be organized by discussing different aspects of 
the treatment of the ethnic Chinese by historical periods. In chapter two, I will focus on 
the treatment of the ethnic Chinese during the Dutch colonial era. In Chapter three, I will 
focus on the treatment of the ethnic Chinese from the Japanese occupation to the end of 
Sukarno’s era. In Chapter four, I will focus on the Suharto era. In the conclusion, I will 
combine all the different schools of thought from the established literature and the new 
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school of thought in order to examine the Chinese Indonesian narrative and how 
discrimination impacted the perception of Chinese Indonesian nationality.  
 This chapter has established the reasoning for this study, as well as explained how 
I have carried out my research. While I have given a very brief overview of Indonesian 
history and how it plays into perceptions of the ethnic Chinese, I will elaborate more into 
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Chapter 2:  
The status of the Chinese Indonesian population in Indonesian society is an issue 
that plays a key part into the political and social treatment of the Chinese Indonesians. It 
is one that has dated back to the era of Dutch colonialism.  Before the Dutch colonial era, 
Chinese Indonesians were actually well integrated into Chinese society. They were 
regarded as no different than the indigenous Indonesian population. However, the Dutch 
insisted on creating a divide between the ethnic Chinese from the indigenous Indonesian 
population, a divide that would have lasting impacts onto the perception of the ethnic 
Chinese Indonesian population long after Indonesia became it’s own nation.  Thus, the 
issue of Chinese Indonesian citizenship and identity became an issue that the Dutch 
colonialists struggled immensely to deal with, given the complications of how the Dutch 
colonialists viewed the status of Chinese Indonesians and later on the demands from the 
Chinese government and their attitude toward the Chinese diaspora. During their four 
hundred year colonial rule, the Dutch either devised or help devised six citizenship laws 
and four international treaties to muddle the matter of Chinese Indonesian citizenship. It 
took until August 1st 2006 for Indonesia to pass a citizenship law that no longer 
separated the national status of the Chinese Indonesians from the peranakan or native 
Indonesians. Because of this confusion over Chinese Indonesian status, classification, and 
citizenship, the Chinese Indonesians were forcibly put into a separate category from the 
native Indonesians which caused a tension that continued and continues to linger 
throughout Indonesian history and politics. As such many Chinese Indonesians no longer 
identified as “just Indonesian”. In many cases, some Chinese Indonesians did not identify 
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as Indonesians at all. This chapter will deal with the circumstances that led to the 
beginning of the confusion of the Chinese Indonesian nationality status, and how the 
Chinese Indonesian people themselves responded. It will be divided into four sections: 1. 
The History of Dutch Colonial Rule, 2. The Difference Between Peranakan and Totok 
Chinese Indonesians, 3. The Issue of Chinese Indonesian Citizenship, and 4. Chinese 
Indonesian Political Identity and Nationality Identification. 
 
I. History of Dutch Colonial Rule 
First off, it is important to cover the brief history of Dutch colonial rule in 
Indonesia in order to emphasize how powerful of an influence it has been and continues 
to be in the Indonesian political and sociocultural realm. From 1602 to 1942, Indonesia 
has been under some form of Dutch Colonial Rule. The Dutch discovered the Indonesian 
islands during the 16th century but it wasn’t until 1602 when the Dutch government 
formed the Dutch East Indies Company to officially carry out colonial rule in Indonesia. 
While the Dutch East Indies Company wasn’t able to gain complete control of the 
Indonesian spice market, the Dutch East Indies Company did succeed in establishing an 
overwhelming Dutch presence in Indonesia.  
 By the 1800’s the Dutch East Indies Company grew bankrupt so Holland 
officially declared Indonesia as an official colonial territory. Like the Dutch East Indies 
Company, Holland tried to control the spice market of Indonesia. It is also important to 
note that this era was the age of emerging nationalism in Europe and part of nationalism 
in Europe included counting and sizing up the amount of colonies each country owned. 
Indonesia, with its seemingly endless supply of spices, exotic tropical fruits, and large 
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indigenous population, was considered a crown jewel in terms of resources and 
colonialist pride. However, the spread of nationalism as both theory and social 
movements proved to be both the impetus and the weakening of Dutch colonial rule. As 
the ideas of nationalism spread with the rise of books and technology and thus privileged, 
upper class Indonesians studying abroad in Holland had access to education and the 
knowledge of political theories, the Dutch found themselves having trouble suppressing 
nationalist Indonesian political movements and political parties in the early 1900’s.  Now, 
the rebellions had ideological justification behind them and thus more traction. 
Eventually, the stronghold for Dutch colonialism was weakened so that Japan could 
easily swipe Indonesia from Dutch hands for a brief colonial rule during 1942-1945. 
After the end of World War II, Indonesia was granted it’s own rule and freedom from 
Dutch colonial and like many other colonial territories granted freedom to form their own 
countries during that period—it struggled to shape it’s own national identity. 
 
II. The Difference between Peranakan and Totok Chinese Indonesians 
As for the status quo of the Chinese Indonesians, they remained at a privileged 
but still oppressed shaky position until the early 1900’s. First off, it is important to 
mention that there were two main categories of Chinese Indonesians. There was the 
Totok Chinese Indonesians, who had been living in Indonesia for generations, and the 
Peranakan Chinese Indonesians, who had recently immigrated to Indonesia from China.  
“During 1811 to 1816, one soldier estimated there were about 100,00 Chinese in Java and 
Madura” (Wilmott).  While “Totoks and Peranakans alike were considered as undesirable 
aliens by many people, even by government officials and regulations intended for 
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foreigners were often applied to citizens of Chinese descent” (Wilmot 79), the Totok and 
Peranakan Chinese populations heavily differed from one another.  
 While the first recorded Chinese immigrants into Indonesian were refugees from 
the Mongol forces of the Kublai Khan and later the Chinese Muslim traders of Cheng He, 
The Peranakan Chinese Indonesian population were primarily rooted from the Hokkien 
region of China. These Hokkien Peranakan Chinese Indonesians had generally lived in 
Indonesia for centuries and had been relatively well integrated with the rest of Indonesian 
society. These Peranakan Chinese Indonesians generally were farmers, laborers, and 
artistans though there was growing monopoly of Peranakan Chinese money lending and 
business networks. Frequently Peranakan Chinese men married native Indonesian women 
because of the shortage of Peranakan Chinese women. Thus, a good number of the 
Peranakan Chinese Indonesians identified purely as ethnically Indonesian and did not 
connect with their Hokkien roots and language. These initial Peranakan Chinese 
Indonesians could be considered well integrated with the indigenous Indonesians and 
Indonesian society. 
 There are several key differences between the Peranakan Chinese and the Totok 
Chinese. One of the key differences is the sheer amount of Totok Chinese versus the  
number of Peranakan Chinese Indonesians.  It is said that the total number of Chinese 
Indonesians increased from 277,000 in 1900 to 582,000 in 1930. What caused this 
relative uptick in the Chinese Indonesian population? Immigration. Thus, we must look 
back to the country of China for that in order to understand the Totok Chinese Indonesian 
migration patterns and why they chose to Indonesia in the first place.  
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Looking at China’s history, it is no coincidence that the increased number of 
Chinese Indonesian immigrants coincides with the China’s Century of Humiliation. The 
Century of Humiliation was a time period when China found itself under the increasing 
influence of European colonialists, just as the Manchu-led, prosperous Ming Dynasty was 
steadily losing it’s once powerful stronghold on China. One of the most important events 
of this Century of Humiliation are the Opium Wars, in which the results led to 
humiliating concessions from the Chinese that included unequal treaties, a constant 
stream of unstoppable supply of opium that was causing massive health problems among 
it’s citizens, and the concession of lands such as giving Hong Kong to the British for a 
hundred years.  While it was used to foreign invaders from other Asian countries such as 
the Manchus or the Mongolians, China had managed to stay relatively impervious to any 
sort of Western influence until now. Beforehand, China had considered itself the center 
of power in the world essentially. During this Century of Humiliation, China suffered 
from the humiliation of the knowledge and proof that there were other countries out there 
in the world that had better technology and stronger power than the Chinese. This 
Century of Humiliation also was the impetus for many nationalistic movements in order 
to reclaim pride in Chinese nationality, which would also have repercussions would later 
in turn affect the Chinese diaspora abroad. 
 This Century of Humiliation is also the reason for the huge numbers of the 
Chinese Diaspora in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Many of the Chinese people who 
could get out of what was increasingly becoming a colonized, opium-wrecked country 
simply did. Like many first generation immigrants, the Chinese diaspora were more 
likely to identify as Chinese and try to keep their nationalistic heritage. This also applied 
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to the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia. Thus, this 19th century Chinese diaspora in 
Indonesia were more likely to identify and classify themselves as Chinese as opposed to 
the Chinese Indonesians who had ancestors that been living in Indonesia for centuries. 
Furthermore these recent Chinese immigrants were usually full-blooded Chinese as 
opposed to the Peranakan Chinese Indonesians, many of whom were mixed. Thus, there 
was a clear cultural divide between the Peranakan Chinese Indonesians and these new 
totok, first-generation immigrant Chinese Indonesian population. 
 Furthermore, it is important to note that many of the Chinese Indonesians who 
immigrated in the 19th century diaspora were upper class, wealthy, and privileged. After 
all, the Totok Chinese Indonesians had to have the resources in order to immigrate out of 
China. Thus, the Totok Chinese Indonesians that immigrated were often wealthy, 
privileged, and had good business connections. This did not escape the notice of the 
Dutch colonialists.  
The Dutch Colonialists were confused as to how to classify the Chinese 
Indonesian population. They regarded the Chinese Indonesian population as separate and 
better than the indigenous Indonesians but they still regarded the Chinese Indonesian 
population as lesser than Europeans. Thus, the Chinese Indonesian population occupied a 
strange, middle ground position in the social caste system. Thus, the Dutch colonialists 
ensured to isolate the Chinese Indonesian population as a separate social class in their 
colonies, and this isolation led to distrust and hate of the Chinese Indonesian population 
by the other people living in the Dutch East Indies. It didn’t matter to them if the Chinese 
Indonesians were Peranakan or Totok. “Totoks and Pernakans alike were considered as 
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undesirable aliens by many people, even by government officials and regulations 
intended for foreigners were often applied to citizens of Chinese descent” (Wilmot 79).  
  The main tactic the Dutch colonialists used to keep the Chinese Indonesian 
population separate from the other people living in the Dutch East Colonies was to 
emphasize the foreignness of Chinese Indonesians. “The Dutch encouraged each racial 
group to maintain their dress and customs. Unless the permit was obtained, the wearing 
of Western dress for non-Europeans (Chinese) and the cutting off of the pigtail was 
prohibited” (Wilmot 3). By enforcing a visual separation, the Dutch colonialists made 
sure to reinforce the notion that Chinese Indonesians are separate from the indigenous 
Indonesian population long after their rule by enforcing coded visual barriers. This visual 
separation made a strong impact into the perception of the Chinese Indonesian population 
by the native Indonesians, and show up as stereotypes that are still used today in modern 
Indonesian pop culture and media.  
 The other major reason the Chinese Indonesian was thought of as separate from 
the indigenous Indonesian population was because they tended to be better off financially 
than the indigenous Indonesian population. This is because the ethnic Chinese tended to 
dominate many of the businesses in Indonesian society, up to the point of being 
overrepresented in comparison to the actual numbers of Chinese Indonesians living 
around. “Chinese shopkeepers, traders, and usurers remained the main source of credit 
for the Indonesian people, in spite of their unconscionably high rates of interest. This 
meant that the average Chinese was far better off than the average Indonesian, and that 
there was a conspicuous number of very wealth Chinese, in contrast to the very few 
wealthy Indonesians. Furthermore, the advantageous economic position of the Chinese 
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was accompanied by superiority attitudes and social exclusiveness” (Wilmot 11).  The 
Chinese Indonesian moneylender soon grew to be a popular stereotype that many 
indigenous Indonesians saw as the representative of the Chinese Indonesian population as 
a whole. This image of the Chinese Indonesian moneylender was hated among the 
indigenous Indonesians because many of the indigenous Indonesians believed that these 
Chinese Indonesian moneylenders were ripping them off with overpriced rates of interest. 
Thus, the indigenous Indonesian population felt that they were trapped in this non-
advantageous position with the ethnic Chinese Indonesian population. They felt that they 
were being economically exploited but because of the poverty of the indigenous 
Indonesian population and the domination of the Chinese Indonesian in the 
moneylending and credit business, the native indigenous Indonesian population felt that 
they were trapped in this endless cycle of poverty. Thus, resentment against the 
indigenous Indonesian population grew against the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese 
Indonesian population were regarded as money-hungry, conniving, untrustworthy, and in 
some plain cases evil and subhuman among the resentful indigenous Indonesian 
population who were forced to rely on these Chinese Indonesian moneylenders. This 
resentment towards Chinese Indonesian moneylenders played a huge part into the 
negative perception of the Chinese Indonesian population as a whole and lasted long after 
the rule of the Dutch colonists ended.  
Meanwhile, the Dutch themselves found themselves threatened by the increased 
economic dominance of Chinese Indonesian businesses and implemented policies in the 
early 1900’s to hurt Chinese Indonesian businesses and in turn helped perpetuate negative 
stereotypes of the Chinese Indonesian population so that the Dutch could maintain their 
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economic stronghold. They introduced “the Dutch Ethical policy at the beginning of the 
century [which] included a number of measures clearly intended to protect the indigenous 
population against the Chinese; to the local Chinese, these measures seemed devised to 
promote the advancement of the native population at their expense” (Suryadinata 66). 
This Dutch Ethical Policy consisted of “the Dutch government establish[ing] a 
“monopoly of pawnshops throughout the Indies, and to establish agricultural credit banks 
to provide loans to farmers at more reasonable rates than those which the private money-
lenders, chiefly Chinese, had claimed” (Wilmot 3). Thus, by lowering the prices of the 
interest rates, the Dutch was trying to win the favor of the indigenous Indonesian 
population by employing “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, in regards to 
moneylending practices. By employing this tactic, the Dutch successfully pitted the 
indigenous Indonesian population against both the Chinese Indonesian moneylenders and 
the Chinese Indonesian population themselves, while the Dutch was able to gain more 
economic profits from the business of indigenous Indonesians. The Chinese Indonesians 
were used as a scapegoat, essentially.  Furthermore, this Dutch Ethical policy helped 
perpetuate the perception that the Dutch were reasonable and rational when governing the 
Dutch East Indies while the Chinese Indonesian moneylenders and thus indirectly entire 
Chinese Indonesian population were greedy, immoral, and obsessed with money at all 
costs—even in the face of humanity. Thus, the Dutch Ethical Policy helped further 
cement the hate against the Chinese Indonesian population.  
Thus, the Chinese Indonesians developed a reputation of sticking amongst 
themselves, which like many stereotypes became one that was self-actualized by their 
circumstances. Since they were regarded with distrust and contempt by both the Dutch 
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and indigenous Indonesian population, most of the Chinese Indonesian population went 
out of their ways to isolate and separate themselves from both the indigenous Indonesian 
and Dutch populations. The Chinese Indonesians occupied this strange place place in 
Indonesian society where they were relatively upper middle class on an economic level 
but low on the social caste system. In the eyes of the Dutch colonialists, Chinese 
Indonesians were considered to be still above the actual indigenous population 
themselves because they had the ability to pose an economic threat against Dutch 
businesses in the first place. Either way, the Chinese Indonesian population was 
considered to be “othered”. This other status led to many debates concerning the 
citizenship status of the Chinese Indonesian population.  
 
III. The Issue of Legal Chinese Indonesian Citizenship 
Defining Chinese Indonesian citizenship grew to be a long, tumultuous process, 
particularly as the Chinese government started to claim citizenship of the Chinese 
diaspora. At first, The Dutch issued “The East Indian Government Act of 1854 defined 
the status of Chinese born in the Indies in two ways. On the one hand, Article 109 put 
them on a level with the indigenous population in legal and administrative matters, in 
contrast to the privileged position of Europeans. On the other hand, an article limiting 
government service to Dutch citizens referred to the existing Dutch law for a definition of 
citizenship. According to the civil law of the time, all persons born in the Netherlands or 
its colonies of domiciled parents were considered Dutch citizens, including persons of 
Chinese descent. This meant that the Indies Chinese, and Indonesians as well, could 
claim all the prerogatives of Dutch citizenship while abroad, even though they were 
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specifically excluded from them while in the colony.” (Wilmot 13). Thus, the Dutch 
defined Chinese Indonesians as a part of their colony, just like the indigenous Indonesian 
population. At the time the law was passed, the Chinese government allowed Chinese 
Indonesians to be classified as Dutch, in exchange for a more beneficial trade agreement 
with Holland. However, the Dutch ran into trouble as China grew to become more 
nationalist in the 1900’s and started claiming the Chinese Indonesians, as with the rest of 
the Chinese diaspora, as Chinese citizens.  A Chinese “law, which was issue on March 
28, 1909, claimed as a Chinese citizen every legal or extra-legal child of a Chinese father 
or mother, regardless of birthplace” (Wilmot 14), despite the fact China had previously 
conceded citizenship to Dutch over peranakan Chinese for trading rights. The reason for 
this was because there were many different nationalist movements that were fostering in 
China over the time. As mentioned earlier, the early 1900s was the middle period of 
China’s Century of Humiliation. With the spread of nationalism and the Century of 
Humiliation, the educated, upper class Chinese who had studied abroad in Europe 
absorbed political theories and established nationalist groups such as the KMT in order to 
regain Chinese national sovereignty. In 1909, the Qing dynasty was on its very last legs 
and the law was passed as a desperate measure to establish ethnic Chinese unity. Thus,  
“when a Peranakan Chinese decided to visit China,” they were “issue[d] a passport by the 
Dutch authorities, who, although careful not to recognize any Chinese jurisdiction over 
him, did suggest that he should obtain clearance from Chinese authorities.” (Wilmot 17) 
Because the amount of power China had was in limbo, the Dutch didn’t want to outright 
cut off relations from China. However, the Dutch still wanted to keep control over the 
Chinese Indonesians. So as a response to this measure, the Dutch issued a new 
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Citizenship Act 2.296 on February 10 1910 declaring that “all persons born in the Indies 
of parents domiciled there were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch citizens” (Wilmot 15) 
as retaliation. While this claims the status of Chinese Indonesians still as Dutch subjects, 
the Dutch still did not make any further moves to try to claim Chinese Indonesian citizens 
when they were abroad in China itself. The status of Chinese Indonesian citizens was one 
that was more assumed than defined. This ambiguity continued into the 20th century. In 
May 1945, China and Netherlands came up with a trade agreement that skated over the 
issues of citizenship of Chinese Indonesians’ nationality. 
 
IV. Chinese Indonesian Political Activity and National Identity 
 Given the confusion of Chinese Indonesian citizenship, the changing status in 
perception of Chinese Indonesian socioeconomic status in Indonesian society, and the 
spread of nationalist movements, it was inevitable that some Chinese Indonesians started 
to play a part in Indonesian politics and formed Chinese Indonesian political groups.  It 
particularly helped that as a whole, the Chinese Indonesians were at least moderately 
well-to-do and thus could afford education. In fact, education played a huge part in 
shaping Chinese Indonesian political activity and cultural identity.  
 The Chinese Indonesian community has and still places a huge emphasis on 
education for their children. While it can be argued that this emphasis on education had 
its roots in the tradition of taking national examinations in order to qualify for 
government positions, the Chinese Indonesian community viewed education as an 
essential, important part of their children’s lives. However, Chinese Indonesians were not 
allowed to put their children in the same schools with the indigenous Indonesian 
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population. Thus, Chinese Indonesians started to establish their own schools for their 
children.  The first Chinese school was established in 1792 but Chinese schools began to 
gain popularity in 1800’s. “In 1899, there were 2017 such schools in Java (and Murdra) 
with 4452 students and 152 students in the Outer Islands with 2170 students” 
(Surayadinata 3). It is no coincidence that this rise in the establishment of Chinese 
schools paralleled with the influx of Totok Chinese Indonesians immigrating to 
Indonesia. As mentioned before, the Totok Chinese Indonesians tended to be more upper 
class and thus more educated than the previous peranakan Chinese Indonesian 
immigrants. There were also a number of intellectual families that fled China during the 
chaos and thus made up a certain percentage of the Chinese diaspora, hence the emphasis 
on education.  
 Chinese Indonesian education soon became the centers for Chinese Indonesian 
political activity, particularly as the pan-Chinese movement grew across Indonesia and 
other Southeast Asian regions with significant Chinese diaspora populations. The first 
Chinese Indonesian political party, the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK), was established 
in 1900. The THHK was established as a Confucious group that attempted to teach and 
spread Chinese culture among the Chinese diaspora. Essentially, it had many similar 
principles to other pan-Chinese nationalist groups at the time.  The first THHK school 
opened in 1901 and gained immense popularity amongst both the Peranakan and Totok 
Chinese Indonesians, which caused the Dutch to start establishing their own schools for 
Chinese Indonesians in an attempt to curb the pan-Chinese movement.  However, the 
Dutch used the establishment of Dutch-mandated schools to further establish the 
socioeconomic standing of Chinese Indonesians as a separate category from the Dutch 
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and the indigenous Indonesian population.  “Consistent to the racial hierarchy above, 
three types of elementary schools were established by the Dutch: the European 
Elementary school, the Dutch-Chinese school and the Dutch-Native school. The school 
fees were charged according to the hierarchy and admission was limited to students of the 
particular racial community. Due to the desire of the Chinese for a European education 
for its social stature, the Dutch-Chinese school used Dutch as its language of instruction 
and was classified as western elementary education, to which the European School 
Regulation applied” (Hoon 2).  These Dutch Chinese schools were basically considered 
to be more “Western” and better staffed and cared for than the Dutch schools for the 
indigenous Indonesian population, up to the point that the Dutch Chinese schools were 
almost as good as the schools for the Dutch students themselves. “The stiff fees, the 
exclusion of non-paying pupils, a faculty composed entirely of expensive European 
teachers, a curriculum nearly identical to that of European schools, Dutch as the language 
of instruction, the admission requirements which effectively limited the pupils to a 
minority of Chinese peranakans: all this made the Dutch-Chinese school an education 
institution for the more affluent. From its establishment in 1908 it was never accessible to 
more than about ten percent of all Chinese children (Govaars 2005: 94). Thus, the 
establishment of the Dutch schooling system helped solidify the idea that the Chinese 
Indonesians were a sort of “model minority” in the Dutch East Indies. It reinforced the 
notion in the Dutch’s eyes that the Chinese Indonesians were above the indigenous 
Indonesian population and almost as advanced as the Dutch themselves. It also helped 
reinforce the Chinese Indonesian upper middle class status level.  However, both the 
Dutch and THHK schools only provided basic education for Chinese Indonesians. “There 
	   30	  
was no advanced or tertiary education for Chinese medium school graduates in pre-war 
Indonesia. Those who wanted to further their studies had to go to China, unless they 
knew sufficient English to attend universities in Hong Kong or Western countries” 
(Surayadinata 19). As a result of this higher socioeconomic status of most of the Chinese 
Indonesians, some of the richest Chinese Indonesians were able to study abroad in 
Holland. By being able to study abroad in Holland, these Chinese Indonesians gained an 
education privilege that other Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians were not 
able to have. They learned about the ideas of democracy, nationalism, communism, and 
other Western political theories of the time. Many of these Chinese Indonesians came 
back to Indonesia and brought back these ideas with them. In some cases, the Chinese 
Indonesians returned with a false sense of equivalency with the Dutch colonialists and 
looked down upon other Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians who did not 
have the privilege to study abroad in Holland. Other Chinese Indonesians believed that it 
was necessary for Indonesia to become more Western in order to gain respect and have 
any semblance of political power in the global sphere—they were Assimilationists. And 
lastly, a few of the Chinese Indonesians helped establish Chinese Indonesian political 
organizations that represented Chinese Indonesian interests.  Overall, like with most non-
Western nationalist political leaders, there were upper class Chinese Indonesians who 
studied abroad in Europe, absorbed the political culture and theories, and brought it back 
to their countries of birth. Thus, the upper class of the Chinese Indonesians helped 
establish a political presence in the Dutch East Indonesians during the 20th century. 
 In fact, Chinese Indonesians found many issues to protest against during the 20th 
century era of the Dutch East Indies. In addition to the issue of Chinese Indonesian 
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schools and the Dutch Ethical Policy, there was other Chinese Indonesian “grievances 
were none-the-less keenly felt. They were confined by law to the well-defined Chinese 
quarter in each town or city, and could not trade in the countryside or travel to another 
locality without requesting a pass from the authorities on each occasion” (Wilmot 2).  
These areas became infamously known as Chinese ghettoes, similar to the Chinatowns all 
over the world or the Jewish ghettos of Middle Eastern Europe.  These Chinese ghettoes 
set the foundation to the areas that eventually became the Chinatowns that Chinese 
Indonesians lived in, long after the Dutch Colonial Rule ended. These Chinese ghettoes 
also made it easier to target Chinese Indonesians for racial violence, such as the 1918 
Kudus Tua incident where many Chinese were killed and their houses were burned down. 
Thus, the Chinese Indonesians had many political issues to fight for if they chose to. 
 However, the majority of Chinese Indonesians were not very political during this 
time. As far as political leanings went, “Chinese Indonesians during this time were 
divided into three groups: 1). “Passivists: comprising the majority of the Chinese 
community, is largely made up of shopkeepers, petty traders, and employees of various 
factories and businesses. Most of these people are apolitical: they believe that it is not 
wise to get mixed up in politics, 2). Participationists: formal and informal leaders of the 
Indonesian Chinese community, most newspaper editor and correspondents, a large 
section of the more well-to-do businessmen, and a representation from other groups as 
well, and 3). Assimilationists. “Those who attended Dutch or Indonesian language 
schools. They believed that Chinese community must endeavor to merge itself into the 
society and culture of the majority of Indonesian citizens as rapidly as possible.” Thus, 
the remaining politically active Chinese Indonesians primarily participated through 
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THHK efforts and focused their efforts on spreading Confucianism and the ideals of the 
pan-Chinese movement in order to help modernize the others in the Chinese Indonesian 
community whether through the THHK schools or later THHK newspapers. However, 
there were some Chinese Indonesian nationalists, primarily those who read the 
sympathizing Sin Po—a Chinese-sympathizing nationalist newspaper. These Chinese 
Indonesian nationalists later formed the Chang Hwa Hi as the first peranakan Chinese 
nationalist group.  
 However, the Chinese Indonesians as a whole tried to separate themselves from 
Indonesian Nationalist groups. The Chinese Indonesians separated themselves from the 
Saerekit Islam, the second most powerful political party at the time, due to conflicts of 
religion—a religious conflict that would later continue to play out during the twentieth 
century. The Chinese Indonesians also separated themselves from the “Indische Sociaal-
Democratisch Vereeniging, which tried to draw the political movements in the Indies into 
the orbit of the international communist movement because the pernakan Chinese did not 
want to be associated with Communist uprisings because they saw Communist uprisings 
as “the desire for revenge, killing, and looting” (Surayadinata 47). So overall, the Chinese 
Indonesian community stayed out of nationalist movements and politics during the first 
this first half of the twentieth century and the minority that were politically active tended 
to separate themselves from Indonesian nationalist movements. Thus, the Chinese 
Indonesian community developed a reputation for being cliqueish, aloof, and a people to 
be feared among others. Also, resentments from their refusal to take a more Indonesian 
national movements would come back to later haunt the Chinese Indonesian community. 
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 As for how the Chinese Indonesian community identified itself, there was a clear 
divide between the Totoks and Perankans still. However, the rule of the Dutch had 
divided a wedge between the Chinese Indonesian community and the indigenous 
Indonesian community, a wedge that was getting harder to separate. It was through Dutch 
rule that the Chinese Indonesian community was building up to become a scapegoat for 
the indigenous Indonesian community. And due to the growing rise of the pan-Chinese 
movement and how both the Dutch and indigenous Indonesian population treated the 
Chinese Indonesians, many of them started to identify more simply as Chinese, a trend 
that would continue towards the later twentieth century.  
 
Conclusion:  
Before the Dutch colonized Indonesia, there was no difference in perception 
between Chinese Indonesians and the indigenous Indonesian population. The Dutch took 
care to separate the Chinese Indonesians and make them a sort of model minority that led 
the indigenous Indonesian population to resent the Chinese Indonesians. In the meantime, 
many new Chinese Indonesian immigrants—totoks—arrived in Indonesia during this 
time period and came with established business capital and relationships. Thus, the 
Chinese Indonesian population was already set up to become an economically privileged 
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Chapter 3: 
While the rule of the Dutch may have been provided the basis towards 
discrimination towards the Chinese Indonesians, the years between Japanese occupation 
to the end of Sukarno’s regime intensified the negative sentiment towards Chinese 
Indonesians.  The time period would be from 1942 to 1965, when the first president of 
Indonesia, Sukarno, was overthrown into a coup. During this time, Indonesia went 
through an intense period from transitioning under Dutch occupation to Japanese 
occupation, and then successfully obtaining but struggling to main national sovereignty. 
In about a decade, Indonesia went through three different regimes, which would be 
considered chaotic and hectic for any country in general.  In addition to this chaos going 
on inside Indonesia, the world around Indonesia was transitioning from a second World 
War to a bilateral, fearful Cold War. Mistrust and paranoia was breeding everywhere. 
During this time, there were four main events going on in and around Indonesia that 
greatly influenced the perceptions of the Chinese Indonesians: the Japanese occupation of 
the Dutch East Indies, the Citizenship A of 1946 and subsequently the Dual Citizenship 
Treaty of 1955, the establishment of the PRC and their foreign policy towards Indonesia 
and other countries in this new bilateral world system, and the disparity between 
Suharto’s admiration of the PRC and the increasing anti-Chinese sentiment going on 
around in Indonesia. Thus, I will divide this chapter into these four sections in order to 
explore how these four events affected perceptions of the Chinese Indonesian in 
Indonesia and consequently how Chinese Indonesians started to view their own national 
identities. 
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I. Japanese Occupation in Indonesia 
While the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia only lasted from 1942 to 1945, the 
events that happened during this period had a tremendous impact on Indonesia and the 
Indonesian nationalists’ journey to local sovereignty. As covered in the previous chapter, 
the first half of the 1900’s brought about the rise of Indonesian nationalist groups. While 
the Dutch colonialists still ruled Indonesia with an iron fist, a number of nationalist 
groups and movements had started to help make frays in the seams. By the time the 
Japanese imperial army arrived, the Dutch stronghold was so weak over Indonesia that 
Indonesia was practically a stateless country in an unofficial sense. Many of the 
mainstream Indonesian nationalist groups looked to Japan as the way to help them gain 
independence, only to have their hopes dashed as soon as the real face of Japanese 
occupation started to show. While the Japanese did not prove to be an ally in helping 
Indonesian nationalists secure independence, the Japanese occupation was the final death 
knell for Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia.  After the Japanese occupation ended in 
1945, the Dutch never was able to maintain control over Indonesia for long and was 
constantly at war with Indonesian nationalist groups.  By late 1949, the Dutch 
government declared that Indonesia was it’s own sovereign state. In the middle of all this, 
the Chinese Indonesians found themselves under attack as a sort of political scapegoat 
during this time of anarchy and chaos, which set the precedent of strong, violent anti-
sentiment against Chinese Indonesians during this time. 
Right before the Japanese occupation, tensions between the Dutch and the 
indigenous Indonesian occupation were at an all time high. The Dutch government had 
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been trying to cooperate with the indigenous Indonesian population by introducing 
policies to help curry their favor to no avail. For ecample, “Merdeka was the introduction 
of the Native Militia Bill by the Dutch government in July 1941. Although they had been 
requesting the setting up of an Indonesian Militia for years, the nationalists in the 
People's Council unanimously rejected the bill. They did so because the Dutch, thus far, 
had refused to recognize the right of the Indonesian people to defend their own (Touwen-
Bouwsma 3). The rift in cooperation between the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists 
meant that many Indonesian nationalists were turning towards the Japanese in order to 
help liberate them towards independence. Many Indonesians were also taken with the 
Japanese’s “Asians for Asia” propaganda campaign and truly believed that the Japanese 
would help liberate Indonesia to independence in the name of pan-Asianism.  The Native 
Militia Bill was thus also the Dutch’s attempt at curbing the Indonesian’s favor away 
from the Japanese. However this did not work out and “after the declaration of war with 
Japan, on 8 December 1941, the first thing the Dutch government did was to arrest all the 
Japanese in Java, about 2,000 persons in all and to place Indonesians known to have 
relations with Japanese under strict police surveillance” (Touwen-Bouwsma 6). In an 
interesting move though, the Dutch government seemed to be wary that they were 
fighting a losing battle against the Japanese and wanted to establish their stronghold as 
much as they could thus “once the war began, the Dutch government created facilities to 
help eventual victims of war among the people in the Indies. Several civil front 
organizations were set up by and for the Europeans, and other population groups like the 
Indonesians and the Chinese were given permission to form their own civil front 
organizations” (Touwen-Bouwsma 7).  From this decree, the Dutch government seemed 
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to anticipate a Japanese occupation takeover but seemed to regard it as a temporary one 
seeing as these civil front organizations appeared to be an attempt to win back eventual 
favor from the Indonesians. The civil front organizations were charities that anticipated 
the need for future victims of the Japanese occupation and the Dutch hoped that it would 
make the Indonesians more grateful towards the Dutch government in the future. 
Furthermore, the decision to create a separate Chinese civil front organization from an 
indigenous Indonesian civil front shows that the Dutch were still trying to govern the 
Chinese Indonesians separately from the indigenous Indonesians. During this time of 
crisis in Indonesian history, the Dutch once again isolated the Chinese Indonesians from 
the rest of the indigenous Indonesians, which in turn them made it easier for the Chinese 
Indonesians to become the scapegoat and target for racialized violence, among other 
things.  
When “the Japanese army in Java arrived on the night of 1 March 1942, all over 
the island planes dropped leaflets bearing the slogan, "One colour, one race", with the 
two flags (Japanese and Indonesian) printed on the reverse sides.” (Touwen-Bouwsma 8). 
The Indonesians had welcomed the Japanese Imperial army with open arms because it 
meant they were free from Dutch rule. This freedom resulted in a state of anarchy that led 
to the formation of local gangs that enforced “order” through plundering and looting the 
areas nearby. This phenomenon of relying on local “nationalistic” gangs and groups to 
enforce order through violence had it’s origins around this time but would continue on 
way past Indonesian national sovereignty when the local Indonesian governments would 
sponsor these nationalistic gangs. But at the time, the main targets of these local gangs 
were the Chinese Indonesians. This era set the precedent for local gang violence to go on 
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without government interference. While there were urban Chinese Indonesians who were 
targeted by these local gangs, “the main target of the bands were Chinese living in rural 
areas. In East Java all the rice mills in the vicinity of Jombang were ransacked, and 
Chinese men were forcibly circumcised by the Nahdatul Ulama. Chinese shops were 
looted and some of their owners were killed. The plundering of Chinese property, 
factories and rice-mills also occurred in Central Java. In Demak the looting began in the 
Chinese kampong. One report says that the Indonesians were shot at by the Chinese who 
had been armed by the Dutch. There upon members of the underground organization 
arrested all the Chinese and threw them into the local prison” (Touwen-Bouwsman 10).  
This resulted in "Peranakans and totoks in Java soon feeling that they had more to fear 
from the Indonesians than from the Japanese . . . [and so] many chose to cooperate with 
the occupying power and entrusted their security to Nippon. (Here it should be noted that 
the choice by Indonesian Chinese to cooperate with the Japanese at a time when China 
was still at war with Japan already undermines arguments by Western scholars that totok 
politics were primarily an extension of the politics of China” (Twang 70).  The fact that 
both the totok and peranakan Chinese Indonesians sided with the Japanese just shows 
how they prioritized survival above everything else. Before Japanese occupation, the 
totok Chinese Indonesians primarily sided with Chinese politics because they thought 
that China was powerful enough to ensure that they received better treatment in 
Indonesia. The Totok Chinese Indonesians thought that China was a more dependable 
and better ally than the Indonesian nationalist groups or the Dutch Government, with 
their insistence on separating the Chinese Indonesian and the indigenous Indonesian 
populations. The Japanese occupation caused a brief separation in that idea because 
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China was also taken over by Japanese occupation at the same time. Hence, the Chinese 
Indonesians try to curry favor with the strongest player in the room at the time—the 
Japanese.  
 However, Indonesian nationalists soon learned to not rely on the Japanese 
imperial army to support their causes. “Within a month, however, the local Japanese 
authorities forced the nationalists to surrender local control of the administration to them 
and reinstated both Dutch and Indonesian civil servants. The Indonesian civil servants 
and police, now supported by the Japanese, gangs and arresting them for disturbing the 
peace struck back at the committees, branding members as leaders of robber gangs and 
arresting them for disturbing the peace” (Touwen-Bouwsman 13). The Indonesian 
nationalist groups were left feeling betrayed and vengeful after the Japanese imperial 
army essentially turned their backs on them. Furthermore, the Japanese started forcing the 
Indonesian people to do forced labor—called “romusha”—and basically enslaved a good 
amount of the Indonesian population, particularly in Java. After World War II was over 
in 1945, the Indonesians declared independence with a national constitution. For awhile, 
the rest of the world—particularly Britain and Holland—had trouble accepting 
Indonesian national sovereignty and there were destructive periods of warfare fought 
over sovereignty. The Indonesians no longer trusted or relied on anyone for help 
obtaining their national sovereignty. However, by late December 1949 the Dutch 
government recognized Indonesian national sovereignty. The time period of 1945-1950 
can essentially be thought of as a “transition” period between the Dutch rule and 
Indonesian nationalist sovereignty. During this time, an important statute on Chinese 
Indonesian citizenship was passed in 1946, and its subsequent follow-up rule, defined the 
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II. Citizenship Laws and Beyond 
When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, “the Indonesian nationalists drafted up a 
Constitution that defined citizenship by stating “citizens are persons who are indigenous 
Indonesians and persons of another nationality who become citizens by way of law.” 
Thus, rather than citing race and religion as determinants, as was done under the colonial 
administration’s civil code, the defining property of citizenship in independent Indonesia 
came to pivot on the attribute of indigeneity. In other words, the indigenous people in the 
former Netherlands Indies territory came to be regarded as the natural, therefore 
principal, component of the nation” (Aguilar 89).  Thus, this law implied that citizenship 
still put first priority on having indigenous Indonesian ethnicity. Because the Dutch 
considered the Chinese Indonesian population to be completely separate from the 
indigenous Indonesian population, Chinese Indonesians could not be considered citizens 
under this law. The influence of the Dutch shows in this citizenship law. “In 1946 the 
fledgling republic issued a law that accorded Indonesian citizenship to local-born Chinese 
automatically (known as the “passive system”), but with the option for a set period to 
reject Indonesian in favor of Chinese citizenship” (Aguilar 15). This 1946 Citizenship 
Law grew controversial amongst the Chinese Indonesian population and ended up 
defining the status of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia for generations.  It grew 
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controversial because the 1946 Citizenship Law felt presumptuous to many Chinese 
Indonesians who would automatically be considered Indonesian citizens if they were 
born there. Many Chinese Indonesians at the time wanted to claim otherwise. This law 
also grew controversial because it never stated that Chinese Indonesians would be as 
equal of citizens as the indigenous Indonesian population.  Also while it may seem 
empowering to enable Chinese Indonesians to define the status of their own citizenship, 
this 1946 Citizenship Law forces Chinese Indonesians to define themselves in a binary, 
either or, decision. There was no option for dual citizenship. Chinese Indonesians are 
forced to choose between their “old” identity and “new” identity in a sense. Thus, what 
this 1946 Citizenship Law is actually reinforce that all Chinese Indonesians are outsiders 
in that whether they choose to reject Chinese citizenship or now, they will always be the 
outsiders who belong to China on a certain level. 
The 1946 law was soon legitimized and recognized by other countries. “In August 
1949 the Round Table Agreement that resolved the question of Indonesia’s independence 
from the Netherlands upheld the “passive system” of the 1946 citizenship act and 
included a provision for local-born Chinese to reject Indonesian citizenship until 
December 1951” (Aguilar 514). Thus, the recognition of the 1946 Citizenship Law at the 
Round Table Agreement was an international acceptance that Chinese Indonesians were 
either Chinese or Indonesian, not both. This legitimization at the law acknowledged that 
the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia was still to be considered as belonging to the PRC. 
Furthermore, the legitimization of the 1946 Citizenship Law at the 1949 Round Table 
Agreement shows that other countries were recognizing the PRC as a significant political 
force. Again, the approval of the 1946 Citizenship Law from other countries shows that 
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all these different governments are tacitly acknowledging the PRC’s jurisdiction over the 
overseas Chinese diaspora in Indonesia. China’s influence grew stronger and by 1955 the 
Indonesians had made a deal with the Chinese in the Dual Citizenship Treaty. ““The 
treaty was a historic achievement as China relinquished its old claim that all persons of 
Chinese descent remained Chinese citizens, even if they had acquired another citizenship. 
On the other hand, the treaty imposed the “active system,” which meant that for Chinese 
to acquire or retain Indonesian citizenship, they had to repudiate Chinese citizenship in a 
court of law, a choice to be certified in an official document.  Significantly, the treaty 
contained no provision for naturalization of “alien Chinese.” (Aguilar 515) Thus, this 
treaty was meant to apply solely to the Totok Chinese with no considered of the Perankan 
Chinese population. The Chinese were trying to claim as many of the Totok Chinese. 
This decision was also significant in that it flat out rejects the idea of a double 
citizenship, making the choice of either or even more prominent. By 1958, the Indonesian 
government in due course introduced an event more stringent citizenship law which made 
more it more difficult for the Chinese to become Indonesian citizens” (Surayadinata 96).  
This citizenship law of 1958 was enforced because of the backlash growing against the 
Chinese Indonesian community. Thus, the options for the Chinese Indonesian community 
were growing narrower and narrower. 
So how did the Chinese Indonesians themselves react to this? On the one hand, 
the government spin of this 1946 Citizenship Law was that the citizenship law was 
empowering for the Chinese Indonesians because they had the choice to choose between 
which country to file for citizenship. But the situation in Indonesia had gotten dire for the 
Chinese Indonesian people themselves as the strong anti-Chinese sentiment started to 
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grow amongst the rest of the population. “As early as 1949 Hsin Pao had warned hua- 
kiao (totok) that "those who want to continue living on this piece of land should have a 
new determination and a new understanding of the situation, or it may not be easy for 
them to retain a foothold any longer . . . tung-ch'iao [fellow country- men] should make a 
radical change in their attitudes. Whatever business we run, besides gaining reasonable 
profits, we also seek to serve the public. In particular the selfish attitude of profiting 
oneself at the expense of others . . . should be eradicated” (Twang 73). Thus, the Chinese 
Indonesians were aware that there was a strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia, 
primarily due to the bad reputation of Chinese Indonesian moneylenders. The statement 
from Hsin Pao shows that some Chinese Indonesians were aware of the stereotypes that 
were held against them and thus decided to fight them to insure their survival. However, 
most Chinese Indonesians ended up turning to China as their safest option. “By 1953 the 
[Indonesian] government was startled to learn that between 600,000 and 700,000—or 
approximately 40 percent—of the local-born Chinese had formally rejected Indonesian 
citizenship. Since nearly another million Chinese were foreign-born and were thus 
already considered [PRC] nationals, about half the entire Chinese population now had 
to be considered mainland citizens, according to the provisions of the Round Table 
Conference” (Aguilar 515). Even when the Dual Citizenship Treaty was established in 
1955, very few Chinese Indonesians knew about or applied for dual citizenship.  So why 
would Chinese Indonesians turn to Chinese citizenship as the safer option for them, even 
though they were living in an Indonesia with fierce anti-Chinese sentiment? Chinese 
Indonesians probably turned to the PRC because they probably were buying into the PRC 
propaganda of a united China. The PRC had seemed to emerge as a powerful, 
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independent nation from the Hundred Years of Humiliation through the power of Mao 
and the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, it seemed as if the PRC and the Soviet 
Union would be allies at the time, because they were both under communism. Thus, it 
seemed as if the PRC was a strong force and it would be most beneficial for the Chinese 
Indonesians to ally with them.  It was purely about strength and protection, not shared 
ideology of communism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, many Chinese Indonesians actually 
found the principles of communism immoral and did not support the Indonesian 
communist national groups at the time. Thus, the Chinese Indonesians chose the PRC 
over the KMT purely for political power reasons, over ideology. “The most urgent task of 
that faction, then, was to try to prove to all the Chinese, and particularly to the local-born 
Chinese, that to be citizens of the Republic of China was not to be "stateless." The KMT 
faction did attempt this crucial task 73--but was apparently unsuccessful in persuading 
local-born Chinese to become "citizens" of the Republic of China. Pro-KMT totoks 
would face other difficulties, such as obtaining a passport for overseas travel” (Twang 
81). 
 Lastly, it was probably easier for many Chinese Indonesians to identify more as 
Chinese as opposed to Indonesian after all the discrimination and separation that had 
been going on through the Dutch colonial era and afterwards. By this time, the Chinese 
Indonesians had to separate themselves from other indigenous Indonesians because they 
were ordained to be there. They were frequent targets for racialized violence and stuck 
with many negative stereotypes of being greedy, outsiders, sneaky, and dangerous. Also 
by this time, the Totok Chinese Indonesians greatly outnumbered the peranakan Chinese 
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Indonesians who had a long history of living in Indonesia. Thus, it was easier for many 
Chinese Indonesians to identify as Chinese.  
 
 
III. Sukarno and China 
While there was a growing anti-sentiment against the Chinese Indonesians in 
Indonesia, Sukarno—the first president of Indonesia—was a reverent admirer of China 
ironically enough. Sukarno had been a leading figure of the most prominent Indonesian 
Nationalist Party in the 1920’s, which was called the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 
and was thus one of the nationalist leaders that the Japanese manipulated and tried to woo 
ironically enough. Sukarno even threw his support with the romusha movements in order 
to curry favor with the Japanese, though he later regretted it. However, despite  the fact 
that he bought into the hope that the Japanese imperialist army was going to liberate 
Indonesia to national freedom, Sukarno had actually idealized China as a sort of model 
for Indonesia to follow as a sovereign nation—long before the Japanese came into play. 
“Sukarno believed that Indonesia and China had identical goals and common aspirations 
in their struggles for national independence. This conviction was an extension of his Pan-
Asianism, and he wrote in the newspaper Suluh Indonesia Muda in 1928: People are 
beginning to be conscious of a sense of unity and a feeling of brotherhood between the 
Chinese people and the Indonesian people, that is, that both are Eastern people, both are 
people who are suffering, both are people who are struggling, demanding a free life.... 
Because the common lot of the people of Asia is certain to give birth to uniform 
behavior; a common fate is certain to give birth to a uniform feeling. He concluded by 
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saying that the Indonesian and the Chinese peoples were "comrades-of one-fate, 
comrades-of-one-endeavor, comrades-of-one-front" (Liu 30) 
Despite his later sympathies with the Communist parties in Indonesia, Sukarno 
never officially identified as a communist. While he wasn’t an anti-Communist like his 
successor Suharto, Sukarno had always been a big believer in democracy. The type of 
democracy that Sukarno had wanted for Indonesia was one that was different from 
Western democracy. It was to be a democracy that maintained the Indonesian principle of 
musyawarah untuk mufaka, or approval of the people as a monolith essentially, as 
Sukarno mentions in his 1945 BPUPKI speech. Thus, early Sukarno’s beliefs should have 
put him at odds with the Communist PRC. However, Sukarno managed to separate the 
idea of communism from the rest of the PRC. “This separation of China from 
Communism was a central feature in Sukarno's construction of the pre-1956 China. One 
of the major reasons for downplaying the role of Communism lies in the fact that 
Sukarno's images of China were fashioned primarily by his domestic concerns. When 
national independence was his overriding consideration, he saw China mainly in the light 
of a nationalist inspiration” (Liu 31). Sukarno was fond of Chinese tradition and history, 
up to the point that special government officials would make sure to import a regular 
supply of his favorite Chinese cuisine such as dim sum. While the rest of the Indonesian 
population for their traditional Chinese heritage and culture was attacking Chinese 
Indonesians, the president of Indonesia fawned over Chinese culture up to the point of 
fetishization. When Sukarno admired China from a political point of view, he tended to 
admire China because of its foundation as a country and the power of it’s nationalism. 
“Sukarno attributed China's rapid progress to two major factors: China was endowed with 
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all the necessary natural resources for economic development; and more importantly, the 
Chinese people, "the PRC's most valuable asset", worked industriously and were willing 
to sacrifice individual interests for the nation's interests“ (Liu 36) 
Sukarno also bought into the pan-Asian ideology that China promoted, which 
ultimately had a significant impact on his relationship with other major powers at the 
time. Sukarno believed that the West and the East were separate each other and as an 
Eastern country, Indonesia should not try to copy “Sukarno's observations of China's 
practices reinforced his opinion that Asia was different and that Asian problems should 
be dealt with by using "Asian formulas". As a newly independent Asian country which 
had made seemingly remarkable accomplishments, the PRC clearly had a greater appeal 
to him” (Liu 39). Sukarno was also reluctant to embrace the West because he felt that 
Indonesia could not use them as an example because they were too far ahead 
development-wise. For example, “Sukarno's trip to the United States was a 
disappointment. Although he was impressed by the material progress in America, 
Sukarno realized that Indonesia and the United States were in different stages of 
development and that it would be difficult for his nation to catch up with America.” (Liu 
33). Thus, Sukarno started to distance himself from the United States.  In the post-World 
War II bilateral world, it would have been natural then for Sukarno to turn to the United 
State’s enemy the Soviet Union. However, Sukarno was also not as taken with the Soviet 
Union as he was with China. “Although Sukarno and his party were well received by the 
Russians, they were also not very pleased with the trip to the Soviet Union, which was 
described as "something considerably less than an unqualified success". For one thing, 
many Indonesians were inclined to see the Soviet Union as a modern Western nation. 
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However, Sukarno and the members of his party were astonished to discover the 
existence of serious social problems in the USSR” (Liu 34). After this trip, Sukarno 
decided to focus more on trying to emulate China as opposed to any other Western states.  
Thus, “Sukarno's 1956 trip to China was a key factor in shaping his perception of the 
PRC. Because Sukarno considered China to be a successful example of socio-economic 
development in newly independent nations, he liked to employ China as an antithesis to 
demonstrate the deficiencies of Indonesia's postcolonial transformation” (Liu 38). Also 
during his trip, China made sure to welcome Sukarno warmly up to the point of holding 
rallies to cheer his arrival. During this time, China made it clear that they were trying to 
aggressively court favor with Sukarno and wanted Indonesia as an ally. After his trip to 
China, Sukarno attempted to take control of power and model Indonesia after China.  
Sukarno’s obsession with China and his attempts to turn model Indonesia after it 
contributed greatly to his downfall and eventual thrust out of power. 
 
IV. Sukarno vs The Rest of Indonesia and the World  
When Sukarno was first elected to be President of Indonesia, it was meant mostly 
as a figurehead position. Indonesia was ruled under a parliamentary system and the 
Parliament, with it’s different political parties battling for power, were the primary source 
of power in Indonesia. Until around 1956, Indonesia was ruled primarily under this 
system of Western-style liberal democracy. 
During this time, Sukarno was growing increasingly agitated as a figurehead 
president and started seeking ways to gain more control of Indonesia. His trip to China 
inspired him to try to take more control of Indonesia and push towards a “guided 
	   49	  
democracy”—a democracy based on the traditional Indonesian village system of listening 
to all sides before having a elder village leader making the decision. In this scenario, 
Sukarno imagined himself as the elder village leader of Indonesia. However, Sukarno’s 
stance on Guided Democracy proved to be so unpopular that his Vice President at the 
time Mohammad Hatta resigned from power, prompting the military to take over local 
police positions and ignore orders from the federal level. This caused Sukarno to 
restructure the Indonesian government. He started by replacing the Vice President and 
Prime Minister with men who agreed with his views. By 1960, Sukarno abolished the 
parliamentary system and implemented the Guided Democracy system and the original 
1945 Constitution he had advocated for.  
Sukarno’s Indonesia was soon turning into an unstable dictatorship. Ever since 
1956, Sukarno had faced numerous assassination attempts from extremist Islamist parties 
such as the Darul Islam extremist groups, which led him to disband major Muslim 
political parties such as the PSI and Masyumi. He had also started to rely more on 
Communist parties such as the PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia, which led to 
many nationalist groups and the military to distrust the PKI and start to engage in power 
struggles with them. Sukarno had also started to increasingly restrict political freedoms 
by taking over the press, in order to maintain his control over Indonesia.  
On an international level, it seemed as if Sukarno’s Indonesia was turning into another 
Communist dictatorship state. Both China and the Soviet Union started to throw more 
support behind Sukarno’s Indonesia. In this bilateral world, the United States started to 
feel threatened that the Soviet Union might snag Indonesia and the CIA even attempted a 
failed assassination of Sukarno at one point. While Sukarno was growing more 
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sympathetic to communism, he wasn’t necessarily trying to turn Indonesia into a 
Communist state. He was trying to get Indonesia under his control and as a result used 
Communism more as an ally and a way to keep the country together.  
 During this time, Chinese Indonesians started to face a backlash from other 
Indonesians due to the fervor and complications of national sentiment in Indonesia. 
Particularly before 1957, Dutch and Chinese Indonesian companies dominated the 
Indonesian economy. Sukarno soon started to nationalize the Indonesian economy most 
notably by issuing the Presidential Directive No. 10 of 1959. The Presidential Regulation 
No. 10 of November 16, 1959, banned Chinese retailers, distributors and middlemen 
from the rural areas of Indonesia, was suddenly rigidly enforced and often amplified. In 
the earlier days of the Peking-Jakarta axis the measure had to all intents and purposes 
been forgotten. Some territorial military commanders, on the basis of the 1959 regulation, 
virtually quarantined local Chinese communities, frequently even if documentary proof 
of Indonesian citizenship was displayed, or forbade movement or settlement of new 
Chinese nationals into their areas.” (Kroeff 26). By this time, Chinese Indonesians were 
considered to be Chinese foreigners and this policy was implemented against them. This 
sentiment was considered such an aggressive move that China ended up sending ships so 
that around 120,000 Chinese Indonesians could escape from Indonesia.  This directive 
caused many rural Chinese Indonesians to move to the cities, in order to survive. 
Sukarno’s fascination with China did not extend to his support of Chinese Indonesians, 
who were still considered foreign and undesirable by everyone else in Indonesia. This 
was the warning sign for Chinese Indonesians that circumstances in Indonesia would only 
get worse, as many Chinese Indonesians would later learn during the Suharto era. 





 In order to establish the basic foundations of the newly formed nation of 
Indonesia, nationalists—whether Sukarno or others—looked to foreign countries for 
sources of inspiration. They used Western models such as liberal democracy and 
socialism in order to establish Indonesia’s path as a country. Unfortunately, due to the 
anti-Chinese Indonesian sentiment that had been propagated since the Dutch colonial era 
and the nationalist movements of the first half of the 20th century, the Chinese 
Indonesians were classified as foreigners and therefore a burden to establishing Indonesia 
as a new country. Chinese Indonesians themselves started to define themselves more as 
Chinese as opposed to Indonesians for their own safety. Meanwhile, Sukarno’s plans to 
take control of Indonesia which included using China as a source of inspiration and 
support and relying increasingly on the Communist party while turning against the 
military and Islamists led to a huge backlash. Since Sukarno’s fascination with China did 
not extend to the Chinese Indonesians, Sukarno set up the stage for the Chinese 
Indonesians to face even more hate in the future.  By 1965, this huge backlash led to a 










Since the end of Sukarno’s Indonesia was a state of increasing instability and 
resentment, it wasn’t hard for Suharto—at that time a Major General of the Army—to 
wrestle away power from Sukarno. Suharto first started off with the ’30 September 
Movement’ in 1965—or as the Indonesian generals called it the ‘Gestapu’, an attempted 
coup on Sukarno’s that turned out to be false and many conspirators suspected was 
planted by Sukarno himself. Suharto blamed the Gestapu on the Communists and 
recruited civilian groups to kill “suspected Communists” all across the country. After 
eliminating Sukarno’s support from the PKI aka the Communist Party of Indonesia, 
Suharto easily turned the military and Islamist parties against Suharto and by 1967 they 
were able to successfully oust him out of power. 
 Sukarno’s reign of Indonesia lasted from 1967 to 1998, one of the longest rules of 
a dictator in history. During this time—often called the “New Order”, Chinese 
Indonesians faced the harshest government regulations against them and were left to deal 
with some of the strongest, most violent anti-Chinese sentiment of the time. Part of the 
reason why the Chinese Indonesians were hit so hard was because the Communists were 
named as the villains and hence many people thought the People’s Republic of China 
gave support to the would-be usurpers. This led for relations between China and 
Indonesia to completely stop for awhile. Both of these things led to increased tensions 
between the Chinese Indonesians and the rest of the Indonesian people, because by this 
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time the Chinese Indonesians had been clearly defined as Chinese by citizenship laws. In 
the meanwhile, this led to Sukarno to attempt an “assimilation” pattern which when 
contrasted with the citizenship laws—just furthered discrimination against the Chinese 
Indonesians. Lastly, Suharto later realized he needed Chinese Indonesians in order to 
seriously build up Indonesia’s economy so the Chinese Indonesians actually got richer 
during this time period, which led to even more resentment against them from the mostly 
poor indigenous Indonesian population. Thus, the discrimination this period actually led 
to many Chinese Indonesians to start to identify more as Indonesians because they were 
being forcibly assimilated, even though they faced discrimination.  
 
I. Fallout from Gestapu 
Even during Sukarno’s era, there was a growing resentment against the People’s 
Republic of China. While Sukarno had been taken in with China, the rest of Indonesia 
had not. The army and Islamist parties were growing distrustful of China and worried that 
China was secretly supporting the Communist parties that were backing up Sukarno and 
taking away his attention. There were many rumors that the PKI were building up a secret 
army in order to fight the Islamist parties and army with the funding and help of the PRC.  
When the Gestapu happened, the Communists in Indonesia were held to blame. Thus, 
these local civilization armies were sniffing for blood and soon found enough 
ammunition to confirm their suspicions against the PRC. 
After a riot, “student demonstrators who ransacked the foreign ministry office in 
Jakarta early in March 1966 reportedly found documents which revealed an agreement 
between Subandrio (then still Indonesian Foreign Minister) and the Chinese Premier, 
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Chou En-lai, signed at an unspecified time well after the Gestapu affair. According to this 
agreement, a new attempt would be made to eliminate anti-communist military leaders 
and "rightist" elements in the Indonesian government, while in return Peking would give 
its support to Sukaro's pet project, the "Conference of New Emerging Forces," which he 
hoped would rival the United Nations. Shortly after the students acquired the document, 
Sukarno reportedly visited the foreign ministry in person, complaining that a secret 
document and agreements with other countries were missing. Almost immediately after 
the discovery of this secret Sino-Indonesian agreement and in the midst of mounting 
unrest in the capital, Sukarno surrendered much of his de facto powers to Suharto (March 
11, 1966)” (Kroef 21). It should be emphasized that during this time Indonesia was in a 
state of anarchy. The military and the Islamist parties were fighting for control of power 
of Indonesia and many of the civilian army groups committed mass killings anywhere. 
These civilian army groups in particular just needed to accuse any target as Communist 
before proceeding to kill them. Thus, Indonesia was suffering through a very unstable 
period and people were looking out for blood. Just the accusation of the PRC being 
behind a conspiracy was enough to send many of these civilian army groups to suspect 
Chinese Indonesians of being secret spies of the PRC—whether they were Totok or 
Peranakan—and mass murder them. Indeed, “there were numerous attacks on Chinese, 
their shops and houses, from Amboyna in the east to Medan in the west in the first eight 
weeks after the coup. On December 10, 1965 in Medan, North Sumatra, some 200 
Chinese, of both Indonesian and Chinese citizenship, were clubbed or knifed to death by 
members of anti-communist Muslim organisations, particularly youth groups.” (Kroef 
25). The sentiment against Chinese Indonesians was at an all time high amongst the 
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common people of indigenous Indonesians, particularly amongst the nationalistic. “In 
November 1966 thousands of university and high school students at a "Youth Pledge " 
rally in Bogor, West Java, demanded the expulsion of all Chinese nationals from 
Indonesia and urged the government to seize Chinese-owned businesses” (Kroeff 30). 
Tensions were at an all time high. 
Interestingly enough, it took the People’s Republic of China awhile to respond to 
this entire affair. At first, China tried to ignore or minimize the effects of the Gestapu 
affair. However, once they realized it was not going away, “new Chinese reports on the 
spreading "white terror," and on the "rabid anti-communist, anti-popular activities of 
Indonesian right-wing forces," began to alternate with alleged reprints of anti-Chinese 
utterances in the Indonesian press and with complaints that the Indonesians were 
sabotaging their shipping agreement with China” (Kroeff 36). Understandably enough, 
China was trying to distance itself from the Gestapu events. They were trying to put the 
blame on anyone who was not themselves or the Chinese diaspora living in Indonesia. It 
is interesting that they blamed the events on the “white terror”, considering Indonesia was 
not having any relations with the United States at the time and was always more distant 
with the Soviet Union ever since Sukarno’s unimpressive visit towards there. China’s 
emphasis on “white terror” reinforced their goals of pan-Asianism. The Gestapu events 
and China’s response to them make the case against the bilateral world picture that 
Western countries tried to paint at this time. During this time, the Western predominant 
view of the world was that a country was either on the United States’s and thus 
Democratic side or the Soviet Union’s and thus Communist’s side. Even though the PRC 
was a communist state and Indonesia shifted from a socialist to anti-Communist state 
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from the regime change of Sukarno to Suharto, both China and Indonesia established 
themselves as firmly operating in their own, anti-Western spheres as evidenced by this 
Gestapu fallout.  Also significant about these news reports is that China seemed 
unconcerned with the PKI and any sort of Communist activity going on in Indonesia. All 
news reports focused on the ethnic Chinese, which indicated where their concerns lied. 
However, China eventually let Indonesia go, as tensions grew worse. ““An emergency 
cabinet meeting was held on October 9, when it was decided to declare an official 
suspension of Jakarta's diplomatic relations with Peking. On October 28, Peking formally 
announced a suspension of its own ties with Indonesia, hold-ing the Indonesians " 
entirely responsible " for this development. After an initial delay and new accusations 
that diplomats were being held hostage, the final exchange of diplomats took place on 
October 31” (Kroeff 45). By 1969, Indonesia announced it was officially suspending 
relations with the PRC.  It’s important to remember that during this time China was 
struggling with it’s own Cultural Revolution.  China was turning insular as it deal with 
it’s problems and Indonesia was left alone without China as an ally until August 8th 1990 
when diplomatic relations were officially restored between China and Indonesia. 
 
II. The Start of Suharto’s New Order 
The core ideology of Suharto’s New Order was a philosophical principle Suharto 
called Pancasila. “Pancasila consists of five principles: the belief in one supreme God, 
humanism, nationalism, popular sovereignty and social justice. This national ideology 
was promoted as the single basic principle for all ‘mass organizations’ and ‘social-
political forces under the Suharto regime” (Morfit, 1986, p. 42).  This Pancasila was 
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influenced by a combination of Indonesian nationalist principles influenced from Western 
liberal theologies and a direct reaction opposite against Sukarno’s regime. The belief in 
one supreme God was a principle that was primarily targeted to accommodate the 
Islamist parties, since Sukarno’s Indonesia had been cagey on religion. While there is a 
Christian minority in Indonesia, the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim and 
according to recent statistics the Muslim population makes up about 88%.  
Another important factor of Suharto’s Pancasila is the idea of nationalism. 
Obviously, Suharto had to rely on nationalists in order to obtain power over Indonesia. 
Thus, he had to cater to the nationalists’ perception of nationalism and national identity. 
Thus, “in Suharto’s Indonesia (and to some extent even now), ‘national identity’ required 
more than proof of birth in the country. Among citizens, there were official categories of 
pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native)—based on ‘race’ and indigeneity—with 
the former being regarded as the ‘authentic’ (asli) inhabitants of the land” (Hoon 151). 
Suharto took the previous Citizenship Law of 1945’s and emphasized the importance of 
ethnicity as right of citizenship even more. Of course, this was also targeted into making 
sure that Chinese Indonesians could not be called citizens. Indeed, during the Suharto era, 
the Chinese Indonesians were reclassified as Cina—regardless of whether they were 
totok or peranakan. “The Suharto regime’s imposition of Cina entailed a renaming of 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo (the PRC) from Republik Rakyat Tiongkok to Republik 
Rakyat Tjina, with at the outset no change in the acronym RRT as Tjina followed 
previous spelling conventions. In consequence, although Tionghoa was derivative of 
Chinese nationalism and thus emblematic of foreignness (perhaps murky in social 
memories by the 1960s), Suharto’s designation of Chinese-Indonesians by the label Cina 
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directly implied a connection with an alien state and a fundamental linkage with another 
polity, and thereby the substance of their choice of Indonesian citizenship and their 
avowed loyalty to Indonesia was questioned” (Aguilar 511). This additional labeling only 
served to further alienate the Chinese Indonesians and stir up more resentment and 
isolation against them. Also during this time, the Dual Citizenship Treaty and the rights 
for Chinese Indonesians to be naturalized as Indonesian citizens was taken away briefly 
until 1969. PCR staying away from Indonesian affairs during this time period, many 
Chinese Indonesians ended up becoming completely stateless. They were not officially 
Chinese citizens nor were they officially Indonesian citizens.  “By 1980, there were about 
3.5 million Chinese in Indonesia, of which 914,00 were PRC citizens, 120, 000 were 
“stateless” and 1,907 were Taiwan nationals” (Surayadinata 97).  Chinese Indonesians 
were pushed to the outsider, foreign edge of Indonesian society on a social class level. 
While Chinese Indonesians may have been defined as outsiders by Indonesian 
citizenship laws, Suharto and the Indonesian government relied on many Chinese 
Indonesians to build up the Indonesian economy. Suharto wanted to develop the 
Indonesian economy in order to help establish Indonesia as a serious, legitimate, 
important presence in the global market. However, Indonesia was starting with a weak 
infrastructure and needed a lot of foreign investment and aid in order to build up capital.  
The Indonesian economy relied on using a lot of capital investment from the Chinese—
whether overseas or especially domestic, much to the displeasure of the indigenous 
Indonesian population.  Unlike the indigenous Indonesian population, the Chinese 
populations overseas and domestic had more business experience and infrastructure to 
become a reliable source of investments. “At the beginning of 1967, a foreign capital 
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investment law was promulgated that stated "foreign capital should be made useful to the 
maximum to accelerate the development of the Indonesian economy and utilized in the 
fields and sectors in which investment of Indonesian capital is not or not yet available 
within a short time to come." The law defined foreign investment as "direct capital 
investment." Local Chinese capital in Indonesia was not considered "foreign investment" 
(Suryadinata 772).  
If the indigenous Indonesian businessmen did want to participate, they were often 
held at a disadvantage compared to the Chinese Indonesian businessmen since the 
primary way for them to get the license to do business was through the alliance 
partnership known as the Cukong system. “Cukong is a Chinese term which means 
“master” but in the Indonesian context, this is used to refer to an ethnic Chinese 
businessman who collaborates with the power elite (including those in the Palace) in joint 
ventures. The indigenous partner provides facilities and protection while the Chinese 
sometimes supplies the capital and runs the business”  (Surayadinata 98). Hence, the 
Chinese Indonesians would always be the ones who controlled the business and gained 
larger shares of the profits earned.  
Understandably, the indigenous Indonesian businessmen declared the system 
unfair and the Indonesian government tried it’s best to give indigenous Indonesian 
businessmen more of an advantage.  “A regulation was issued in 1976 requiring all 
offering investments in Indonesia to assume the form of joint ventures. In the joint 
ventures, the local partners should consist completely of, or at least a majority of, 
indigenous Indonesians.” Keppres No. 14A was issued in 1979 stated that “government 
institutions and ministries give priority to businessmen and contractors, who are from the 
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economically weak group (i.e. indigenous Indonesians), for the purchase of goods and in 
terms of contracts.”  In terms of big projects, joint ventures between Chinese Indonesians 
and the indigenous population are encouraged but the indigenous partner should hold at 
least 50 per cent of the share and they should also be active business partners” 
(Surayadinata 98). However, these new regulations were not publicized and the status 
quo pretty much stayed the same. It also didn’t help that because the Chinese Indonesians 
were so used to being so isolated from the rest of the population, their businesses tended 
to be as exclusive to Chinese Indonesians as possible. “The most common practice of 
structural familism in traditional ethnic-Chinese firms is to reserve the most crucial 
position in the management exclusively to a family member of the owners who 
themselves are linked by family relations. Normative familism refers to the situation 
when the corporate values or the values of the business network are extensions of the 
values maintained in the family. Paternalism, harmony, uprightness and informality are 
examples of normative familism manifested in the ethnic-Chinese business institution and 
network. Many traditional ethnic-Chinese firms are basically family businesses, relying 
almost totally on family resources in both capital and personnel needs as well as moral 
reasoning” (Wijaya 311) Thus, the Chinese Indonesian population continued to be 
overrepresented in the Indonesian economic sector. Not only that but during the Suharto 
era, the Chinese Indonesian population overall became richer. The Chinese Indonesian 
had gone from being an economic privileged class during the Dutch colonial era to an 
even richer, more economically privileged class during the Suharto era. Naturally, this 
made the Chinese Indonesian presence even more conspicuous and a strong backlash 
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against the Chinese Indonesians was flamed by both the indigenous Indonesian 
businessmen but also the rest of the indigenous Indonesian population. 
While Chinese Indonesians were certainly used to be singled out and targeted for 
racism under previous eras such as the Dutch colonial rule, the Suharto reign became 
infamous for the increasing government regulations that discriminated against the 
Chinese Indonesians. As mentioned above, the popularity of the Chinese Indonesian 
population was at an all-time low amongst the rest of the indigenous Indonesian 
population due to anti-Communist fervor and the generally high economic status of the 
Chinese Indonesian population. The anti-sentiment that had been growing since the era of 
Dutch colonialism had risen to a burning hatred that could not be ignored by Suharto and 
the Indonesian government. “Chinese-ness’ was also widely perceived as a ‘domestic’ 
problem (known as the ‘Chinese problem’ or ‘Masalah Cina’) which was detrimental to 
the nation’s solidarity. Viewing the dominant position of the Chinese in the nation’s 
economy as a problem, the New Order government attempted to solve it by endorsing a 
military-backed ‘Assimilation Program’ (‘Program Pembauran’)” (Hoon 152). 
First off, the idea of assimilating an ethnic minority population that could never 
be fully considered to be real citizens by the rest of the population and the government is 
an irony in itself. It had been established by both the citizenship law and the treatment of 
the Chinese Indonesian population by the indigenous Indonesian population that there 
would always be a certain foreign “Chinese-ness” to them that could never be eliminated. 
Thus, this government mandated Assimilation Program was a paradox that was 
guaranteed to push the Chinese Indonesians in a further other-ized and resented category. 
Ultimately, this push towards the paradox of assimilation could be credited to the idea of 
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nationalism—of trying to protect the indigenous Indonesian population while trying to 
demonstrate both the power of the Indonesian government, people, and society. 
The Assimilation Program mainly consisted of government regulations that tried 
to restrict the Chinese culture of the Chinese Indonesian population. Special emphasis 
seemed to have been put in eliminating all usage of the Chinese language.  In a way, the 
Assimilation Program was a direct opposite reaction to the Dutch colonialist regulations 
on the Chinese Indonesian population centuries ago. While the Dutch colonialists insisted 
on keeping the Chinese Indonesian population separate from the indigenous Indonesian 
population by enforcing them to be visually and physically separate form the rest of the 
indigenous Indonesian population, the Assimilation Program focused on trying to 
eliminate one of the most visible symbols of Chinese-ness—the language. In a way, the 
Assimilation Program’s direct opposition to the Dutch colonial regime shows the long 
lasting influence of Dutch colonialism. These Assimilation Program regulations included 
prohibiting “conspicuous (menyolok) displays of Chinese characters, as well as other 
religious and customary practices in public; instead, such activities were required to take 
place “internally, … within the boundaries of the environment of the household of a 
family… or place of worship” and  “banning “alien owned” (read: Chinese) retail stores 
from rural areas. That measure was followed by the banning of Chinese from residing in 
rural areas and enforced by regional military commands” (Ling 136). While part of these 
regulations to group the Chinese Indonesian population together in the city and eliminate 
them from rural areas were stricter implementations of Sukarno’s earlier rule, the 
definition of conspicuous displays of Chinese characters became a trend for this 
Assimilation Program. Soon last names started to classify as conspicuous displays of 
	   63	  
Chinese characters. “After Suharto came to power in 1966, a name-changing regulation 
was once again introduced” (Surayadinata 104). Like many of the regulations of the 
Assimilation Program, this was never formally implemented but it was highly encouraged 
for the Chinese Indonesian population’s safety.  Not changing a Chinese last name to an 
Indonesian last name could be taken, as a clear sign that a Chinese Indonesian subject 
was disloyal to the Suharto regime. Therefore, most of the Chinese Indonesian population 
changed their last names from Chinese to Indonesian. Interestingly enough, many 
Chinese Indonesians picked Indonesian last names that were the equivalent to their 
previous Chinese last names. Hence, this was a sign that many Chinese Indonesian 
people still tried to keep their Chinese heritage or at least saw themselves as different 
from the indigenous Indonesian population.  
 Apart from eliminating the usage of the Chinese language in public and enforcing 
obvious discriminatory practices, the Assimilation Policy is significant to Chinese 
Indonesians because it stripped away all of the power that Chinese Indonesians used to 
have. After Suharto came to power in 1966, all the Chinese Indonesian political parties 
were banned. They were banned under the guise of being secret gatherings for communist 
spies but it was really just an excuse to disempower the Chinese Indonesian population. 
Similarly, all the Chinese language papers—which had been the start of Chinese 
Indonesian political parties—were banned. The Chinese Indonesians who wanted to be 
politically active were forced to join indigenous Indonesian political parties, often the 
same ones that were suspicious of Chinese Indonesians. According to the leaders of the 
Assimilationist Policy, this regulation was enforced in hopes that Chinese Indonesians 
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could assimilate with indigenous Indonesian political parties. In reality, it just eliminated 
the one outlet Chinese Indonesian political grievances could be heard.  
 As mentioned in the second chapter, Chinese Indonesians had placed great 
emphasis on education for Chinese Education children. After the 1965 coup, “all ethnic 
Chinese children, regardless of their citizenship, had to go to Indonesian schools. Those 
who still wanted to study Chinese tended to engage Chinese tutors at home. However, the 
government had strongly discouraged this practice. A few who could afford to send their 
children overseas succeeded in giving their children an opportunity to learn Chinese but 
their number was small. The majority of the Chinese children, even the totoks, had 
gradually lost an active command of the Chinese language” (Surayadinata 102). Thus, the 
Assimilation Policy used what was a former source of empowerment and community for 
the Chinese Indonesian population and completely dismantled and stripped it of it’s once 
Chinese heritage. While it was understandable to depoliticize the Chinese language 
schools since they had not only served as a source of Chinese Indonesian political 
congregations but were also divided into pro-Beijing and pro-KMT factions, the 
elimination of Chinese language schools meant that the future generations of Chinese 
Indonesians lost touch with their heritage. While it can be argued that in general many 
second-generation immigrants around  start to lose fluency in their heritage tongue once 
they start to settle into their immigrated country and keep going further down 
generations, the Chinese Indonesian situation is different because of this enforced 
paradox from the Chinese government. While Chinese Indonesians were not allowed to 
be classified as true Indonesian citizens, they were not allowed to be Chinese citizens. 
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These future Chinese Indonesian children were stuck occupying a hated, separate space 
far off. 
Since Chinese Indonesians were left without an outlet to express political power 
and were faced with very real threats of violence and danger, there was much not room 
for Chinese Indonesians to play an active role. Mostly, Chinese Indonesians were forced 
to comply with the Assimilation Policy ordinances as best as they could. Many Chinese 
Indonesians lived in separate communities in order to avoid very real threats of violence. 
The Chinese Indonesians had to also self fulfill negative stereotypes of being a very 
insular community in order to survive. Because of the socially enforced isolation and 
separation of the Chinese Indonesian population from the rest of Indonesian society, 
Chinese Indonesians were forced to work with and rely on each other to survive.  The 
labels of totok and peranakan mattered a lot less, since the rest of the Indonesian society 
didn’t distinguish between the two. Between the lingering suspicions of Communism and 
the resentment against the economic status of Chinese Indonesians, the indigenous 
Indonesian was willing to paint a caricature of Chinese Indonesians as a fearful, 
dangerous people. While three were the lingering stereotypes of the ethnic Chinese as 
greedy, sneaky, and distrustful people, some rumors were turned mystical as some of the 
indigenous Indonesians claimed that Chinese Indonesians were “said to practice “black 
magic” and enter treaties with “a wild boar” in order to obtain their economic dominance 
(Aguilar 522)”. Thus, it became necessary for the Chinese Indonesians to isolate and 
protect themselves. In order to protect themselves, Chinese Indonesians relied on 
gangsters called keamanan for protection. “There indeed exists a “permit” for which 
keamanan is exchanged. It is a permit authorized by bureaucrats and hoodlums to grant 
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their “nonservice” so that the Chinese can be left alone and carry on their everyday 







Under the guise of nationalism, Suharto’s regime of Indonesia made things at it’s most 
perilous for Chinese Indonesians. After relations between the People’s Republic of China 
and Indonesia soured, Suharto enforced a paradox of government ordinances that stripped 
both sides of Chinese Indonesian nationality into a void and isolated them from the rest 
of society. While Chinese Indonesians had previously leaning towards their Chinese 
heritage for safety, these new circumstances stripped Chinese Indonesians of power and 


















Thesis Conclusion:  
 The idea of the Chinese Indonesian population having a separate nationality status 
from the indigenous Indonesian population started with the Dutch colonialists. The Dutch 
colonialists chose to separate and isolate the Chinese Indonesian population from the 
indigenous Indonesian population in order to divide and conquer as well as take 
advantage of the Chinese business connections. As a result, many of the indigenous 
Indonesian population was left feeling bitter towards the Chinese Indonesian population 
and a lot of resentment and stereotypes were directed towards the Chinese Indonesian 
population. 
 Meanwhile, Indonesia was trying to obtain national sovereignty through a very 
European method—nationalism. Indonesian nationalists were quickly split amongst 
different parties and power struggles were fought whether it was with the Dutch, the 
Japanese, or amongst themselves. Meanwhile, nationalism soon meant that Chinese 
Indonesians must not only be separated and excluded from the indigenous Indonesian 
population. However since the Chinese Indonesians generally were in better economic 
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standing than the native indigenous Indonesian population, the Indonesian government 
relied on them to build Indonesia’s fledgling economic infrastructure—which caused 
only more resentment, hate, and violence against the Chinese Indonesian population by 
the indigenous Indonesian population. Indeed, Indonesia’s history as a nation-state has 
mostly consisted of Indonesia responding in reactionary way: from embracing pan-
Asianism to shutting out China and practicing a sort of isolationism, to Sukarno and 
Suharto’s actions generally being reactionary towards the previous regime. 
 The Chinese Indonesian population went from being considered equal to the 
indigenous Indonesian population, to being considered and embracing their Chinese 
heritage sides, and then to being legally barred from both their Chinese and Indonesian 
heritages and occupying a separated, isolated space in between. Through every step of the 
way, there were always sectors of the Chinese Indonesian population that tried to 
ascertain political power but mostly the Chinese Indonesian populations mostly just 
chose to identify their nationality as whatever they thought would help them best. During 
Sukarno’s era, the Chinese Indonesian thought it would be their Chinese heritage that 
would save them but during Suharto’s era, Chinese Indonesians quickly learned that they 
must assimilate as much as possible while knowing they could never truly assimilate with 
the indigenous Indonesian population. Particularly in Suharto’s era, the Chinese 
Indonesians forcibly had their Chinese heritage and political power stripped as they grew 
richer than ever. 
 While Suharto had a long run, eventually the Asian financial crisis of 1995 hit 
Indonesia hard. The Chinese Indonesians were seen as a scapegoat and most infamously 
there were the May 1998 riots where hundreds of Chinese Indonesians were mobbed and 
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killed by poor, resentful indigenous Indonesians. Suharto was soon ousted out of office 
and subsequent regimes have taken steps to allow Chinese Indonesians equal citizenship 
and to be more embracing of imported Chinese culture. However, the legacy of the 
Chinese Indonesian discrimination will always remain as a unique but ultimately 
enlightening example of how a minority population can be persecuted due to the 
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